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Abstract 
 
In this paper, the amount of income redistribution in the United States, the European Union, 
and Switzerland is compared and empirically related to economic, political, and behavioral 
determinants elaborated in the literature. Lying in between the two poles, Switzerland 
provides unique evidence about the relative merits of competing hypotheses. It tips the 
balance against the economic explanation, which predicts more rather than less income 
redistribution in the United States compared to the EU. It only weakly supports the political 
model linking proportional representation and multiparty structure (which also characterize 
Switzerland) to redistribution; yet the Swiss share of transfers in the GDP is low. Behavioral 
explanations receive a good deal of support from the case of Switzerland, a country that 
shares with the United States the belief that hard work rather than luck, birth, connections, 
and corruption determine wealth. In this way, the Janus face of Switzerland may help to 
explain the difference in the amount of U.S. and EU income redistribution.  
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to compare the amount of income redistribution of the 
United States, the European Union (EU), and Switzerland. While a European country, 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU and has some institutional features 
reminiscent of the United States. Like the Roman god Janus it is therefore predicted 
to “look both ways”. Indeed, EU social programs will be found to be more extensive, 
generous, and pro-poor and tax systems to be more progressive than those of United 
States. Invariably, Switzerland stands in between. What are the economic, political, 
and behavioral factors that may be responsible for this? 
Possible economic explanations are the variance and skewness of the before-tax 
income distribution, the social costs of taxation, expected future changes in income 
for median voters and volatility of income over time. However, Alesina et al. (2001) 
argue that these economic determinants cannot explain observed differences in 
redistributive policies between the United States and the EU. They find that while the 
before-tax income in the United States has higher variance and more skewness than 
in the EU, redistribution in the United States is less although the deadweight losses 
from taxation seem to be about the same. Switzerland will be shown to lie in 
between. On the other hand, the “Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis, 
originally suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and formulated by 
Benabou and Ok (2001), is confirmed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) who 
empirically show that people with high expected future income do not favor 
redistribution in the United States.1 In the EU, income mobility is relatively low, with 
Switzerland again situating in between but having a lower level of public expenditure 
                                                 
1 Using a data set from Russia, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) have shown that even those who are 
currently rich may tend to support redistribution if they expect their welfare to fall. This is known as a 
“tunnel effect”. Molnár and Kapitány (2006) find that people who have no clear knowledge about the 
immediate and the distant future favor redistribution more than those with negative expectations.    
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than the EU average. Thus, contrary to theoretical predictions, we observe a negative 
correlation between income mobility and public expenditure on the aggregate level.  
As to political explanations, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) cite U.S. institutions that 
prevent minorities from gaining political power which could be used for income 
redistribution. At the federal level, the United States applies majority rule for election 
to the Congress and for president; moreover, courts have consistently been rejecting 
popular attempts at redistribution. The constitutions of EU member countries are 
more oriented toward proportional representation and less toward protection of 
private property.  Switzerland on the one hand has a degree of proportional 
representation that even exceeds the EU average; on the other hand, its courts 
strongly protect private property. Extensive direct democratic control might serve to 
limit public welfare spending while enforcing efficiency in redistribution. But then, 
Switzerland is comparable to the EU average when it comes to the amount of 
transfers and subsidies.  
The behavioral explanations for redistribution [Fong et al. (2006)] emphasize 
reciprocal altruism. This hypothesis states that U.S. voters dislike giving money to the 
poor whom they perceive as lazy. Moreover, Gilens (1999) and Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) argue that troubled race relations are a major reason for the absence of an 
American welfare state. EU citizens, by way of contrast, tend to believe that the poor 
have been unfortunate, and until recently, immigration from non-white countries has 
been too limited to make race a relevant category.2 Between these two poles, 
Switzerland seems to be similar to the United States in all of the three dimensions 
cited above, giving rise to the correct prediction that it spends relatively little on public 
welfare. 
                                                 
2 However, the involvement of second-generation immigrants from North Africa in the 2007 riots in 
French suburbs and the murder of film director and publicist van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan in the 
Netherlands in 2004 may be changing this. 
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It should be noted that all of these explanations abstract from the incentives of 
politicians, acting as entrepreneurs, to redistribute income and wealth in order to 
secure (re)election [cf. Brunner and Meckling (1977), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)]. 
This ultra-political explanation hinges on the fact that the cost of redistribution usually 
takes on the form of efficiency losses that have to be borne by all citizens, whereas 
its benefits can be channeled to those lobbies that provide support or those voters 
who are pivotal at the next election. Of course, the institutional differences cited 
above make it easier for politicians to pursue their objectives in some countries and 
more difficult in others. Yet, politicians have a permanent incentive to push back 
those constraints that limit their freedom of action. In all, this hypothesis predicts that 
redistribution occurs largely regardless of preferences in the population. For 
simplicity, it will not be pursued in detail but may serve as an explanation of why the 
amount of redistribution keeps growing over time (for an analysis in the case of social 
health insurance, see Zweifel, 2007). 
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the next section, the size and structure of 
redistribution in the United States, selected EU countries, and Switzerland are 
presented.  Section 3 tests the economic explanations for redistribution, which are 
contradicted by the case of Switzerland. Section 4 again finds that political 
explanations are not confirmed by Swiss experience. Section 5 presents behavioral 
determinants which are not only successful in explaining the differences between the 
United States and the EU but also are confirmed by Switzerland. Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Size and Structure of Redistribution in the United States, the EU, 
and Switzerland 
 
In this section, the basic facts concerning redistribution in the United States, the EU, 
and Switzerland are presented, starting first with government spending and revenue, 
and then turning to regulation designed to achieve income redistribution, such as 
minimum wage laws. 
 
2. 1. Government Spending  
Table 1 shows the size and composition of government expenditure. General 
government spending in the EU-15 averages 46 percent of GDP; it reaches 53 
percent in France and even 56 percent in Sweden but only 37 percent in the United 
States. Switzerland is just below the U.S. value with 36 percent. However, it is the 
share of transfers (subsidies and social benefits) where differences are most marked. 
In fact, the sum of these categories amounts to 17.5 percent of GDP in the EU 
compared to 12.4 percent in the United States. Here Switzerland sides with the EU, 
its share being 16 percent.  
Table 1. Composition of General Government Expenditure, 2006a  
Percent of GDP 
 
Consumption  
         (Appropriation Account)  
Country 
 
 
Total 
Government 
Expenditure Total 
Consumption 
Goods and
Services Wages
Subsidies 
 
 
Social 
Benefits 
 
Fixed 
Investment
 
US 36.6 15.8 6.1 9.7 0.4 12.0 3.3
EU-15 46.0 20.4 10.2 10.2 1.2 16.3 2.5
Austria 49.2 18.0 8.7 9.3 3.1 18.3 1.1
France 53.4 23.6 10.5 13.1 1.5 17.8 3.4
Germany 45.7 18.3 11.1 7.2 1.2 18.6 1.4
Sweden 55.5 26.8 11.1 15.7 1.6 16.7 3.1
UK 45.0 22.0 10.6 11.4 0.4 13.0 1.8
Switzerland 36.3 10.9 2.8 8.1 4.0 12.0 2.3
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook database (No 82, Dec. 2007). 
a. Details may not sum to totals because of excluded categories. 
 
Table 2 presents the breakdown of social expenditure (which notably includes old-
age benefits). First, the United States is far below the EU average with 14.7 and 23.8 
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percent of GDP, respectively. Switzerland even exceeds the EU average with 26.4 
percent, coming close to welfare states such as Germany (27.4 percent) and France 
(28.5 percent). The main reason are old-age benefits, where U.S. public expenditure 
makes up a low 5.3 percent of GDP, compared to the EU share of 8.8 and the Swiss 
share of 11.8, respectively. In relative terms, the differences in family benefits are 
even more pronounced. Here, the United States spends one-fifth of the EU value (0.4 
compared to 2.2 percent of GDP in the EU-15), with Switzerland once more falling in 
between (1.2 percent). However, this does not necessarily mean that countries such 
as France, Germany, or Sweden are pro-poor because social security systems 
typically redistribute from the young to the old as well as from the rich to the poor.  
Table 2. Public Social Expenditure, 2001 
Percent of GDP 
                                                        
Country Total Old-Age Family Unemployment Health Incapacity Other 
US 14.7 5.3 0.4 0.5 6.2 1.1 1.2
EU-15 23.8 8.8 2.2 2.1 6.1 2.9 1.7
Austria 26.0 10.7 2.9 1.3 5.2 2.5 3.4
France 28.5 10.6 2.8 2.9 7.2 2.1 2.9
Germany 27.4 11.7 1.9 2.3 8.0 2.3 1.2
Sweden 29.8 9.2 3.8 2.4 7.4 5.2 1.8
UK 21.8 8.1 2.2 0.6 6.1 2.5 2.3
Switzerland 26.4 11.8 1.2 1.0 6.4 3.8 2.2
 
Source: OECD (2004) Social Expenditure database. 
 
2. 2. Government Revenue   
Government expenditure of a country may be pro-poor; yet if it is financed in a highly 
regressive manner, the net effect of government activity may turn pro-rich. Table 3 
summarizes the composition of government revenue in the EU, the United States, 
and Switzerland.  First of all, the EU governments claim a much larger share of the 
GDP (46 percent on average) than their U.S. counterpart (34 percent). The figures do 
not match precisely those of Table 1 because in 2006, governments were 
accumulating debt at a different pace. The Swiss government showed the best 
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budgetary discipline among the countries sampled, its expenditure share in the GDP 
of 36.3 percent exceeding its revenue share of 35.4 percent by relatively little.  
Second, governments substitute direct taxes by social security contributions. In the 
United States, the ratio of the former to the latter is 14/7, while in the EU it amounts 
to 12/16, and in Germany, even 11/17. With a ratio of 15/7, Switzerland definitely 
resembles the United States here. Thus, in terms of direct taxation, the EU countries 
look like tax havens compared to the United States and Switzerland but they make 
up by charging much higher social security contributions. Whether this reflects a 
more marked pro-poor orientation depends on the relative progressiveness of social 
security and income taxation. By way of contrast, indirect taxation generally is 
regarded as regressive. The ratio of direct to indirect taxes is 14/7 for the United 
States, 12/14 for the EU, but 15/7 for Switzerland. On this account, both the United 
States and Switzerland look more pro-poor than the EU, with France (12/15) marking 
an extreme. 
Table 3. Composition of General Government Revenue, 2006 
Percent of GDP 
 
Country Total Receipts 
Tax Revenue 
 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Property 
Income Other
   Direct Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes       
   Total Households Businesses        
US 34.0 13.6 10.3 3.3 7.3 7.0 0.8 5.3
EU-15 45.6 12.2 9.3 2.9 13.6 15.5 0.9 3.4
Austria  47.8 13.1 10.7 2.4 14.0 16.0 1.2 3.5
France 50.8 11.8 8.7 3.1 15.4 18.3 0.7 4.6
Germany 43.8 10.6 9.2 1.4 12.1 17.3 0.6 3.2
Sweden 57.9 20.2 16.5 3.7 17.1 13.2 2.2 5.2
UK 41.9 17.2 13.1 4.1 12.8 8.4 0.6 2.9
Switzerland 35.4 14.9 11.3 3.6 7.2 7.1 1.4 4.8
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook database (No 82, Dec. 2007). 
 
However, not only does the status quo reveal important differences; developments 
during the last few decades differ, too. Table 4 tracks the government expenditure 
categories “Subsidies” and “Social benefits” of Table 1 (complemented by “Current 
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transfers”, not evidenced there) since 1980. By that time, countries such as Austria, 
France, and Germany were full-fledged welfare states with GDP shares above 20 
percent, while the United States stood at 13 percent. Since then, it has caught up 
somewhat, reaching some 17 percent in 2006. While data for 1980 are not available 
for Switzerland, in 1990 its share of 15 percent was close to that of the United States. 
However, Swiss transfer payments have increased particularly fast since then, 
attaining 20.5 percent in 2006, not far from the EU average of 21.7 percent anymore. 
 
Table 4. Government Expenditure on Subsidies, Social Benefits and Other Current Transfers, 
1980- 2006 
Percent of GDP 
 
Country 1980 1990 2000 2006 
US 12.9 13.7 14.9 16.6 
EU-15 21.3 21.8 21.7 21.7 
Austria 25.5 26.6 27.4 26.1 
France 21.3 22.7 24.2 25.4 
Germany 21.5 21.2 24.0 23.2 
Sweden 25.9 27.8 25.9 25.7 
UK 16.3 15.1 17.0 18.4 
Switzerland - 14.9 18.9 20.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic outlook database (No 82, Dec. 2007). 
 
Summing up the findings so far, Switzerland resembles the EU in terms of its 
government expenditure but is more similar to the United States in terms of its 
government revenues. It used to be close to the United States with regard to 
transfers but has been approaching the EU during the last two decades. 
 
2. 3. Regulation designed to redistribute income   
Redistributive policies do not always take the form of government expenditure. Labor 
market policy is another channel through which redistribution occurs. One of its 
indicators, the ratio of minimum wage to average earnings in industry and services,  
amounted to 31 percent in the United States (2006), 37 percent in the United 
Kingdom (2006), and 46-48 percent in France (2002) [Eurostat, 2006, OECD 
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Economic Outlook Database, No. 82, Dec. 2007, European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO)]. In some EU countries as well as in Switzerland, sector-specific 
collective agreements rather than statutory minimum national wages are the main 
mechanism used for regulating low pay. In particular, the ratios of collectively agreed 
minimum wages to average earnings in Germany varied between 35 and 50 percent 
(2004, EIRO). In Switzerland, the trade union confederation considers the monthly 
gross wage of CHF 3,550 (about 56 percent of the average gross wage) as a 
minimum wage. In this sense, it is closer to the EU than to the United States 
(provided the UK, France, and Germany can be taken as sufficiently representative). 
By keeping real wages higher than they would be otherwise, minimum wages favor 
redistribution for the unionized or “protected” segment of the labor market. Thus,  
labor market regulations redistribute in favor of labor, see Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004). We can argue that on this issue Switzerland resembles a group of European 
countries more, because it protects labor more than the US. 
Table 5. Labor Market Regulation in the U.S., EU, and Switzerland 
Units as indicated 
 
Country 
Employee 
protection a 
  
(index) 
Minimal 
annual 
leave, 2003 
(weeks) 
Unemployment benefits, 2005 
Replacement ratio b Duration  (index 0-2) 
   
Initial phase 
(percent) 
Long-term 
 
US 0.10 0.0 66 32 0.22 
EU c 1.10 4.4 69 47 0.58 
Austria 1.10 5.0 67 56 0.68 
France 1.40 5.0 72 44 0.47 
Germany 1.30 4.0 73 52 0.75 
Sweden 1.10 5.0 71 53 0.02 
UK 0.35 4.0 51 52 0.96 
Switzerland 0.55 4.0 80 55 0.31 
  
 Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, Faggio and Nickell (2007). 
a. Measures the strength of legal restrictions on hiring and firing and ranges from 0 to 2, with 2 the maximum (1998). 
b. Average net replacement rate across six family types with assumed earnings equal to 100% of AW. 
c. Simple average of thirteen EU countries (excludes Greece and Luxembourg). 
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Minimum wages are just one (particularly prominent) aspect of labor market 
regulation. Table 5 lists five additional indicators of such regulation, ranging from an 
index of legal employee protection to minimum annual leave and on to three aspects 
of the replacement ratio in unemployment benefits. On all five items, the United 
States scores lower than both the EU average and Switzerland, who however scores 
lower than the EU average in three cases.  
The preceding data suggest that EU countries and Switzerland provide more public 
welfare than the United States. However, the World Values Survey (Table 6a) shows 
that Americans engage in more private provision of welfare through charity than EU 
and Swiss citizens. Roberts (1984) hypothesizes that public provision of welfare in 
part crowds out private charity. Potential donors, seeing government transfers on the 
rise, have a weakened motivation to give. Being altruistic, they might also be willing 
to donate through the government. However, the symmetry of substitution effects 
leads to the prediction that those who donate privately prefer to limit public transfers.  
Table 6a. Membership in Charitable Organizations, 1995-1997 
Country active member, % inactive member, % not a member, % 
US (1995) 27.3 14.9 57.8 
Germany (1997) 7.9 13.8 78.3 
Sweden (1996) 6.7 15.8 77.5 
Switzerland (1996) 5.8 15.3 78.9 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
Table 6b. Charity Giving as a Share of GDP, 2005 
Country % of GDP 
US 1.67 
France 0.14 
Germany 0.22 
Ireland 0.47 
Netherlands 0.45 
UK 0.73 
Switzerland 0.37 
 
Sources: Charities Aid Foundation, ZEWO Foundation. 
Therefore, a low level of public expenditure in the United States can be explained 
with high private donations. Table 6a tends to support this view. In the United States, 
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27 percent of the population report to actively participate in a charitable organization, 
compared to 7.5 percent in Germany and a mere 5.8 percent in Switzerland. 
Conversely, only 57 percent of U.S. citizens indicate not to be involved in any 
charitable organization, whereas their European counterparts are close to the 80 
percent level. Table 6b shows that the amount of charity giving in the US is also 
higher than in EU countries and Switzerland, suggesting that public transfers cause a 
reduction in voluntary donations in Europe, as predicted by the crowding-out 
literature. On this score, Switzerland definitely sides with the EU rather than the 
United States.  
 
3. Economic Explanations of Income Redistribution 
One of the main economic explanations of income redistribution states that the more 
marked is pre-tax income inequality, the higher is the demand and the political 
pressure for redistribution.  This is the basic idea behind the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-
Richard (RRMR) model3 stating that the lower the income of the median voter relative 
to the income of the average voter, the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.   
Table 7. Gini Coefficients in the U.S., EU, and Switzerland, 1960-2005 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
US 42.3 39.3 39.7 42.7 45.7 45.0 
EU-15 35.1 35.1 31.2 29.6 30.3 29.9 
Austria - 29.5 31.6 26.3 29.2 26.0 
France 49.0 39.8 36.4 28.0 28.2 28.0 
Germany 38.0 39.2 36.6 30.8 29.8 28.0 
Sweden - 29.5 19.4 21.9 27.2 23.0 
UK 25.5 25.4 25.3 33.5 34.6 35.0 
Switzerland - - 35.9 33.8 31.8 31.1 
 
Source:   WIID database, World Institute for Development Economics Research 2006. 
 
Indeed, U.S. pre-tax income inequality was high in 1960 [Gini coefficient of 42, see 
Deininger and Squire (1996)] and has been again increasing since 1970 to reach a 
                                                 
3 Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981). 
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Gini of 45 in 2005. In the same period, the average value of EU countries has fallen 
from 35 to 30. The most notable decrease occurred in France, from 49 to 28. As to 
Switzerland, the first measurement dates back to 1980. Since then, its Gini coefficient 
has been decreasing even faster, from 36 to 31 (the U.S. and EU values being 43 
and 30, respectively, at the time). Therefore, in 1980 Switzerland lay right in between 
the two poles but has been approaching the EU fast since.  
In view of the marked pre-tax income inequality in the United States, combined with 
low government expenditure and few labor market interventions, the RRMR model is 
contradicted by the evidence. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) point out that the main 
failure of this model rests on its simplistic assumptions, viz. the ‘one person, one 
vote’ rule and the median-voter outcome. Barenboim and Karabarbounis (2008) show 
empirically that the very rich have more weight above and beyond the ‘one person, 
one vote’ rule in the political process, while the very poor do not vote at all. 
However, as hypothesized by Bénabou and Ok (2001), earnings mobility may 
dampen a poor but forward-looking voter's enthusiasm for redistribution [for empirical 
support using U.S. data, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)]. As a partial test, Figure 
1 plots public transfers (GDP share) against the ratio of average income in the 
(relatively wealthy) fourth and average income in the (middle class) third quintile. 
Admittedly, this is a rather poor measure of mobility, as discussed in Muren and 
Nyberg (2005).  However, transition probabilities are available for six countries only   
[see OECD (1996)]. Since the quintile transition probabilities are quite similar 
between OECD countries [Muren and Nyberg (2005)], a large inter-quintile income 
difference can serve as a rough indicator of income mobility. In the United States, the 
difference between the third and the fourth quintile is indeed large (1.55 or 55 percent 
more income), whereas it is around 1.3 in the EU on average. When the outlier 
Denmark (DK in Figure 1) is excluded as an outlier to a negative relationship, the 
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negative slope of the regression becomes slightly more marked, providing weak 
support for the POUM (Prospect Of Upward Mobility) hypothesis of Bénabou and Ok 
(2001). However, the coefficient of determination remains low, and United States (US 
in Figure 1) as well as Canada (CAN), Australia (AUS), Japan (JAP), and Ireland 
(IRE) lie far below the regression line. 
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Figure 1: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP in 2007) and income mobility 
parameter x defined as the ratio of the income in the fourth quintile to the income in the third quintile; 
αˆ =26.2112, βˆ = -2.6698, 2R =0.0036 for the whole sample (the t statistic is -0.2636, i.e. not 
significant); αˆ =36.81, βˆ =-10.838, 2R =0.0493 if Denmark excluded (the t statistic is -0.966, i.e. still 
not significant). Country labels: A=Austria, AUS=Australia, BEL=Belgium, CAN=Canada, 
CH=Switzerland, D=Germany, DK=Denmark, E=Spain, F=France, FIN=Finland, GRE=Greece, I=Italy, 
IRE=Ireland, JAP=Japan, NL=Netherlands, NOR=Norway, POR=Portugal, S=Sweden, UK=United 
Kingdom, US=United States, EU-15=simple average of old EU member countries without Luxembourg 
(A, BEL, D, DK, E, F, FIN, GRE, I, IRE, NL, POR, S, UK). Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008. 
 
Some authors establish a link between openness of the economy and the level of 
income redistribution by postulating the compensation hypothesis [Cameron (1978), 
Katzenstein (1985), Garret (2000), Adsera and Boix (2002)]. This hypothesis states 
that small open economies compensate their losers from international liberalization 
with government interventions in the domestic economy, mainly with an increase in 
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transfer payments. Higher levels of trade imply growing risks associated with the 
international business cycle and thereby cause higher levels of income volatility and 
income inequality. As stated in Section 1, under the veil of uncertainty, risk-averse 
individuals may be willing to support income redistribution programs, especially if 
designed to help those who suffered an unexpected loss in their assets (health, 
wealth, wisdom, i.e. skills).  
Emphasizing the former effect, viz. that open economies expose citizens to more 
income volatility because they are subject to external shocks, Rodrik (1998) relates 
income redistribution to the openness of the economy. Other authors [Adsera and 
Boix (2002), Balcells Ventura (2006)] emphasize the latter effect, the increasing 
inequality based on the idea that openness to trade creates winners and losers within 
economies. She shows that the impact of openness on income redistribution crucially 
depends on income per capita and the size of potential loser sectors. While trade has 
a positive effect on the size of the public sector in rich countries (those abundant in 
high-income factors), it negatively affects the level of income redistribution in poor 
countries.  
Figure 2a plots4 transfers as a share of GDP against an indicator of openness, the 
ratio between the sum of exports and imports relative and GDP. Indeed, the United 
States, being a rather closed economy, has the lowest transfer shares. And in 
general, increased openness does go along with more transfers for “rich” OECD 
countries, thus seemingly supporting the result of Balcells Ventura (2006).  However, 
with a t statistic of 1.433, this bivariate regression does not provide conclusive 
evidence of a positive relationship.  
                                                 
4 Given that transfers are associated with inefficiencies, one could argue that transfers as a ‘type of 
insurance against the vagaries of openness’ should progressively increase with openness. However, a 
regression of Transfers on Openness and (Openness)2 yields a negative but insignificant term. The 
nonlinear relationship between political (and social) openness and welfare is examined by Koster 
(2008).  The author finds weak evidence of nonlinearity for social openness, but no evidence for 
political openness. 
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Figure 2a: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP in 2003) and openness x, 
defined as sum of exports and imports 2007 over GDP in 2007;αˆ =19.609, βˆ =0.0473, 2R =0.1094, t 
statistic is 1.433 (not significant). Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008.        
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Figure 2b: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between the natural logarithm of transfers y (in % of GDP in 
2003) and the natural logarithm of openness x, defined as sum of exports and imports 2007 over GDP 
in 2007; αˆ =2.4068, βˆ =0.1716, 2R =0.1716, t statistic is 1.977 (significant at the 6.4 percent level).   
Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008.      
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In a next step, Figure 2b plots the natural logarithm of the share of transfers in GDP 
against the natural logarithm of the indicator of openness as defined above. Now the 
t statistics has the value of 1.977 and thus implies weak evidence (at the 6.36 
percent significance level) of a positive elasticity of transfers as a share of GDP with 
respect to the indicator of openness. 
One might argue that openness as defined by Rodrik (1998) fails to measure the 
impact of foreign trade shocks on the welfare of a population. Shifts in the terms of 
trade, however, directly indicate changes in the gains from trade a country can reap 
and hence welfare. During the period 1960-2006, the U.S. terms of trade exhibited a 
standard deviation of 0.133 percentage points p.a. While comparable data are 
lacking for the EU, Austria and Germany come in with 0.05 and 0.085 points, 
respectively (authors’ calculations from OECD Economic Outlook Database, No. 82, 
Dec. 2007, World Bank and WMM). Once more, Switzerland is in between with 0.106 
points. Note that the high U.S. value would lead one to predict a high amount of 
redistribution, contrary to the empirical evidence. At best, one could argue that social 
mobility in the United States serves as a substitute for redistributive policies.  
On the whole, economic explanations do not seem to be very successful in predicting 
the amount of income redistribution, at least when relying on government expenditure 
and transfers as indicators. If one is willing to use Janus-faced Switzerland as a test 
case, this country never is even close to the regression line. Thus, it causes the 
balance to be tipped against economic explanations.  
 
4. Political Explanations 
The United States, the EU, and Switzerland differ in terms of their political 
institutions. The first aspect relates to the electoral level. The United States has a 
majoritarian system where the plurality rule is applied in federal elections (i.e. each 
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district delegates the representative with the most votes), while all EU countries (with 
the exception of the United Kingdom and France) have proportional representation. 
Proportional representation tends to produce multiparty parliaments and 
governments, while majority rule favors a strict two-party system as in the United 
States or a multiparty system dominated by two players as in the United Kingdom. 
The political science literature [Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milesi-Ferretti et al. 
(2002), Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003)] predicts that proportional representation 
tends towards universal programs benefitting various groups (pensioners, workers, 
poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results in targeted “pork barrel” programs.  
Persson and Tabellini (2003) find supporting empirical evidence in that countries with 
proportional representation have GDP share of government expenditure that ceteris 
paribus is 5 percentage points higher than with majority rule.  
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of electoral rules on fiscal policy, plotting transfers as a 
share of GDP against a measure of proportional representation for most OECD 
countries. There is indeed weak evidence of a positive correlation. While the EU-15 is 
close to the regression line, the United States constitute an outlier. This is true of 
Switzerland too, in spite of its system of proportional representation and a system 
with several strong parties that is similar to continental EU countries. The reasons for 
this divergence are discussed below. 
The second aspect of political institutions relates to the government. The United 
States has a presidential system while all EU countries are parliamentary 
democracies (with the exception of France, whose government is controlled by the 
majority in the parliament, however). Presidential regimes at first sight result in a 
concentration of power; however, they tend to have a stronger separation of powers 
designed to prevent abuse [cf. Persson et al. (1997)].  Since this abuse goes along 
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with increased government expenditure and transfers to supporting clientele groups, 
presidential systems are predicted to induce less income redistribution. 
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Figure 3: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP in 2003) and the degree of 
proportional representation x; 058.20ˆ =α , 16.4ˆ =β , 1663.02 =R , t statistic is 1.91 (7.22% significant) . 
Degree of proportional representation is the natural logarithm of the size of electoral districts, defined 
as the number of electoral districts in a country divided by the number of seats in the lower or single 
house for the most recent legislature. Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008, Persson/Tabellini 
(2004). 
 
The third aspect is political parties. Barriers to entry for parties are particularly high in 
the United States, likely due to the country’s vast size and low population density, 
both of which help to diffuse social conflict. This has resulted in the absence of a 
strong socialist party, whereas the European left was able to organize and divulge its 
ideas, resulting in a higher amount of income redistribution. 
The fourth aspect of political institutions of relevance for redistribution is fiscal 
decentralization. This creates obstacles to an excessive role for the central 
government in fiscal matters, making it more difficult to tax the rich in some part of 
the country in favor of the poor localized in other parts. Again, the United States is 
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characterized by a higher degree of fiscal federalism than most EU countries [Inman 
and Rubinfeld (1992)], which may help explain its lower amount of income 
redistribution. 
As to Switzerland, it is on the U.S. side on items three and four (Supreme Court, 
fiscal decentralization) but on the EU side on items one and two (proportional 
representation, low barriers to entry for political parties). However, the distinguishing 
feature of Switzerland in this context is its direct democracy with popular initiatives 
and referenda. Feld et al. (2007) find that public expenditure tends to be better 
tailored to the needs of the electorate in direct than in representative democracies. If 
the electorate wishes to be pro-poor, then Swiss redistributive policies might attain its 
objectives at a lower value of total transfers than representative democracies. As 
noted in the context of the first aspect cited (proportional vs. majority representation), 
this observation is not discriminating because Switzerland is below the regression 
line in Figure 3. However, the Netherlands and Spain, two countries with almost no 
direct democratic control, have the same GDP share of transfers as Switzerland. 
Therefore, direct democratic control cannot alone explain why Switzerland has low 
transfers in spite of its high degree of proportional representation.  
Summing up, four aspects of political institutions seem to be relevant for income 
redistribution. One of them (degree of proportional representation) could be 
quantified; it did show the predicted relationship with the transfer share in GDP. 
Using again Switzerland for corroborating evidence, the country shares institutional 
features both with the United States and the EU. However, it is unique in its degree of 
direct democratic control, yet has the same GDP share of transfers as the 
Netherlands and Spain, two countries with quite different political institutions. 
Therefore, political explanations appear only slightly more convincing than the 
economic ones.  
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5. Behavioral Explanations 
Behavioral explanations of income redistribution importantly revolve around the 
concept of imperfect altruism. While prefect altruism is exclusively governed by 
recipients’ preferences, imperfect altruism also reflects donor preferences. In 
particular, it predicts that people will oppose public welfare if they believe that 
recipients take advantage of the system, a behavior that often is attributed to 
members of ethnic minorities. Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina et al. (2001), Luttmer 
(2001), Alesina and Glaeser (2004), and Luttmer and Singhal (2008) find that people 
oppose redistribution favoring ethnic or racial groups other than their own as well as 
minorities that are overrepresented among the poor.  
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Figure 4: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP 2003) and ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation x; 87.23ˆ =α , 915.9ˆ −=β , 0675.02 =R , t statistic is -1.18 (not significant). See Persson 
and Tabellini (2003). The index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation is the level of lack of ethnic and 
linguistic cohesion within a country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fragmented) and 
averaging five different indices. Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008, Persson/Tabellini (2004). 
 
As a first piece of evidence, Figure 4 plots the bivariate relationship between public 
transfers and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. While most EU countries are quite 
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homogeneous with respect to ethnicity and language, Belgium and Spain display a 
degree of heterogeneity that exceeds that of the United States (Canada is the 
extreme case here). There is a negative correlation, supporting the hypothesis. 
Switzerland has a high heterogeneity too, reflecting the strong division between the 
German-speaking, French-speaking, and Italian-speaking parts of the country. 
However, this time it lies right on the regression line, providing corroborating 
evidence. 
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Figure 5: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP 2003) and migration rate x in 
2007, defined as the net number of migrants per 1,000 
inhabitants; 047.26ˆ =α , 458.1ˆ −=β , 1948.02 =R , t statistic is -2.093 (significant at the 5.08 percent 
level). Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008. 
  
A second aspect of fragmentation is immigration. As Figure 5 shows, countries with 
higher immigration rates tend to spend smaller fractions of their GDP on transfers. 
The corresponding bivariate regression comes very close to conventional 
significance levels. The United States constitutes an outlier with especially low 
transfers, presumably due to a third aspect, racial heterogeneity (which is more 
pronounced than in the majority of EU countries). Indeed, work by Kinder and 
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Sanders (1996) reveals that racial resentment is the most powerful determinant of 
whites’ (who are overrepresented among payers) opinions on welfare, affirmative 
action, school desegregation, and the plight of the inner city. Switzerland lies close to 
the regression line. On the one hand, its rate of migration and share of foreign 
population are very high, similar to those of the United States. But on the other hand, 
being foreign is not necessarily associated with (permanent) poverty, similar to most 
EU countries.   
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Figure 6: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP 2003) and birth rate x in 
2007; 469.31ˆ =α , 834.0ˆ −=β , 1058.02 =R , t statistic is -1.526 (not significant). Data source: OECD, 
CIA World Factbook 2008. 
 
Following Razin and Sadka (1995), the birth rate may be seen as a third indicator of 
fragmentation. A high rate of fertility calls for a great deal of intra-family redistribution, 
which squeezes out public transfers.  This argument suggests a negative correlation; 
however, a positive relationship cannot be excluded due to reverse causality.  A high 
birth rate could be argued to trigger a great deal of transfers in the guise of family 
allowances. Moreover, many governments see family allowances as a means to 
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increase the birth rate.  When transfers are plotted against the birth rate, a negative 
relationship obtains (see Figure 6). The United States has a fertility rate that is only 
exceeded by Ireland, one-half higher than the EU average, which reflects very low 
rates in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Italy.  Switzerland again lies close 
enough to the regression line to provide some support to the hypothesis. 
A fourth behavioral element is beliefs. The hypothesis is that a society who believes 
that luck, birth, connections, and corruption determine wealth will choose a high 
degree of redistribution, financed by high taxes, see Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005). By way of contrast, the conviction that high income 
and wealth are the result of work effort goes along with little income redistribution.  
Beliefs do differ sharply between the United States and the EU. Most Americans 
believe that anyone can get out of poverty by hard work and that the poor remain 
poor only because they refuse to make the effort. By way of contrast, Europeans 
generally think that poverty is due to bad luck and not the individual’s responsibility. 
Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2007) measure the willingness-to-pay for justice in the 
United States using dictator games. Dictators were given $10 to split between 
themselves and recipients. The authors find that one third of the dictators are willing 
to pay one dollar out of ten for obtaining the information whether poverty was due to 
disability or substance abuse. Finally, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) show that a history 
of misfortune in the recent past such as unemployment and personal trauma makes 
people more risk-averse and less optimistic about upward mobility. These changes in 
beliefs are found to have a positive and significant effect on redistribution. 
Figure 7 plots transfers against a score that ranges from 1 (hard work always brings 
a better life) to 10 (hard work does not bring any success).  The Unites States is the 
observation closest to the score of 1 but still lies below the regression line. Germany 
(D) and Denmark (DK) mark the other extreme. With a coefficient of determination of 
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0.3 and a t statistic of 2.778, this is one of two best-fitting bivariate regressions 
designed to explain the share of transfers in GDP. Here again, Switzerland lies right 
on the regression line, lending additional support to the hypothesis. 
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Figure 7: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP 2003) and the belief x that luck 
determines success (median value for each country, measured as an index from 1 to 10, with 10 
indicating strongest belief); 319.6ˆ =α , 495.3ˆ =β , 3006.02 =R , t statistic is 2.778 (significant). Data 
Source: OECD, World Values Survey. 
 
A fifth behavioral element is political attitudes.  For a long time, political scientists 
have been relating left-wing orientation to attitudes in favor of income redistribution 
[Downs (1957)]5. However, the relationship between the political orientation of the 
median voter and the actual amount of redistribution (measured by the share of GDP 
devoted to transfers, as before) turns out amazingly weak. In Figure 8, political 
attitudes of the median voters range on a scale between 1 (left-wing) and 10 (right-
wing). Note that there is little variation, with the EU-15 at 5.3 and the United States at 
                                                 
5 Frohlich and Boschmann (1986) provide supporting empirical evidence for the United States and 
Canada. 
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5.8. Switzerland lies close enough to the regression line to provide supporting 
evidence, which however is weak to begin with in view of the very low coefficient of 
determination.  
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Figure 8: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP 2003) and political orientation x 
(median value for country, measured as an index from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the right-wing 
orientation); 099.41ˆ =α , 444.3ˆ −=β , 0506.02 =R , t statistic is -1.063 (not significant). Data Source: 
OECD, World Values Survey. 
 
As a sixth and final behavioral dimension, one can cite religion. There are three 
strands of theory, all of them predicting a negative relationship between religiosity 
and income redistribution. First, Benabou and Tirole (2006) model collective cultural 
beliefs, one of which is religion. In their ‘highly religious’ (Protestant) equilibrium, hard 
work and industriousness are believed to have rewards in the afterlife, the amount of 
redistribution is low, and average effort and output are high. In their ‘less religious’ 
equilibrium, there is less effort and more redistribution (e.g. through alms). Second, 
Scheve and Stasavage (2006a, 2006b) argue and provide evidence that religion 
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provides insurance against adverse events. Therefore risk-averse religious 
individuals express less demand for redistribution as a collective insurance devise, 
resulting again in a negative predicted relationship between religiosity and 
redistribution.  A third strand argues that public welfare crowds out participation in 
church and charitable activities, giving once more rise to a negative correlation.  
Hungerman (2005) and Gruber and Hungerman (2007) find evidence that public 
insurance spending indeed crowds out religious charitable spending.  
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Figure 9: Relationship xy βα ˆˆ +=  between transfers y (% of GDP 2003) and religiosity x (median 
value for country, measured as an index from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the highest importance of God 
in life); 695.33ˆ =α , 877.1ˆ −=β , 3175.02 =R , t statistic is -2.906 (1% significant). Data Source: 
OECD, World Values Survey. 
 
Figure 9 shows the strength of religious orientation (1 = no importance of God in life, 
10 = maximum importance) to vary considerably, with the United States marking the 
high end. With a coefficient of determination of 0.32 and a t statistic of -2.906, this is 
the best-fitting bivariate regression designed to explain the share of transfers in the 
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GDP. Hence, the partial correlation between religiosity and the share of transfers in 
GDP is clearly negative, supporting the theories expounded above.  On this score, 
Switzerland shares the somewhat guarded attitudes prevailing in the EU. Being 
located close to the regression line, it provides additional evidence supporting the 
theoretical arguments relating religion to redistribution. 
 
6. Final Assessment 
In sum, out of six behavioral factors that according to the political science literature 
influence attitudes with regard to income redistribution, all (with the exception of 
ethno-linguistic fragmentation) were found to be partially correlated with the amount 
of income distribution as measured by public transfers as a share of GDP. And in all 
cases, Switzerland, located between the United States and the EU, is on or close to 
the regression line, in contradistinction to the economic and political explanations 
considered. This observation is informative: Switzerland consistently lies between the 
United States and the EU average on all six scales used as explanatory variables. If 
the estimated relationships have validity, it should therefore be located on or close to 
the regression line rather than constituting an outlier. Since this prediction is 
confirmed, it tips the balance in favor of behavioral explanations of income 
redistribution. 
Table 8. Final model for the share of public transfers in GDP  
  Coefficient Standard Error t value 
Constant 19.290 7.925 2.434
Belief 2.537 1.215 2.089
Religiosity -1.457 0.654 -2.229
 
458.02 =R  
 Joint significance test: ]0055.0[19.7)17,2( =F  
 
A final assessment can be based on multivariate analysis relating the share of 
transfers in GDP to mobility, openness (economic), proportional representation, 
ethno-linguistic fragmentation, migration rate, birth rate (political), belief that luck 
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determines success, political orientation, and religiosity (behavioral).  Applying the 
reduction procedure developed by Doornik and Hendry (2001), one arrives at the 
final model of Table 8. The two explanatory variables retained are both behavioral, 
viz. the belief that luck determines success and religiosity.  Moreover, their 
coefficients do not differ from the coefficients in the respective bivariate regressions. 
They are significant at the 5 percent significance level in Table 8 (compared to a 1 
percent significance level in Figures 7 and 9). However, these two variables jointly 
are highly significant, as indicated by the test statistic ]0055.0[19.7)17,2( =F . 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, an attempt was made to explain the difference in the amount of public 
income redistribution between the United States and the European Union (EU), 
based on an empirical examination of three sets of determinants, economic, political, 
and behavioral, with the most recent data for 20 developed OECD countries6 listed 
on p. 12. The previous literature [Alesina and Glaeser (2004)] looks at bivariate 
relations between the amount of public redistribution and various economic, political, 
and behavioral variables for large data sets including developing countries. In 
addition to the variables in Alesina and Glaeser (2004), we included further variables 
in our study such as a measure for social mobility, migration rate and birth rate. Since 
Switzerland, a non-EU country, is almost always located between the two polar 
cases, we use it as a test case providing corroborating or contradicting evidence. 
Economic determinants predict more rather then less income redistribution in the 
United States than in EU, contrary to facts. Before-tax income inequality is higher and 
the income distribution is more skewed and incomes and terms of trade are more 
volatile in the United States than in the EU countries. However, U.S. income mobility 
                                                 
6 However, the regression on the belief about luck vs. effort as well as the final multivariate regression 
do not include Greece due to a lack of data. 
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is higher, possibly serving as a substitute for redistribution.  Pertinent bivariate 
regressions have poor statistical fit. Moreover, Switzerland lies rather far from the 
respective regression lines, providing contradicting rather than corroborating 
evidence.  
Political variables include district rather than proportional representation, a two-party 
vs. multiparty system, a presidential rather than a parliamentary democracy, courts 
emphasizing property rights, and failure of a strong and lasting socialist party to form; 
all distinguishing the United States from the EU. However, bivariate regressions do 
not have much explanatory power. And again, Switzerland comes close to being an 
outlier, thus failing to buttress the weak supporting evidence.   
Behavioral explanations include ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the country, the 
migration rate, the birth rate, the belief that luck determines success, the degree of 
left-wing orientation, and the strength of religious belief. On several of these scores, 
the U.S. population constitutes an outlier. In particular, it sees hard work rather than 
luck as a determinant of success, contrary to the population of a typical EU country.  
Two bivariate regressions (with belief that the luck determines economic success and 
religion as the explanatory variable, respectively) attain coefficients of determination 
of 0.3 or more. In addition, the Swiss observation is on or close to the regression line, 
thus providing supporting evidence.  
In a final assessment, we identify the most significant variables based on a 
multivariate regression, complementing the bivariate analyses by Alesina and 
Glaeser (2004). Both the bivariate and the multivariate regressions suggest the 
following conclusions. The United States has less income redistribution than the 
European Union for three main reasons. The first is political. With its absence of 
proportional representation (a feature shared with Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, countries with a low amount of redistribution, too), the United States has an 
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impediment against resolving political conflict through buying off minorities, a tradition 
characterizing notably Austria and Sweden (see Figure 3 again). Using Switzerland 
as a test case, its observation is off the regression line by about the same amount as 
the United States (and on the same side).  Therefore, it does contribute a measure of 
confirmatory evidence.  The other two reasons are behavioral. The U.S. population 
does not believe that chance determines economic success, contrary to the EU 
population (see Figure 7 again). Second, it believes that God is of critical importance 
in life, which is held to a comparable degree by the Portuguese population only but 
certainly not the EU population on average (see Figure 9 again). On both scores, the 
Swiss observation is on or close to the respective regression line, providing a bit of 
supporting evidence. And on both scores, Switzerland is located between the United 
States and the EU, showing its Janus face.  
It is appropriate to point out the limitations of this analysis. First, it does not rest on a 
unifying theoretical basis, drawing on economics, political science, and sociology in 
an eclectic manner. Second, possible determinants are tested mainly one by one in a 
series of bivariate regressions. This of course entails the risk of attributing influence 
to a factor that should be attributed to another factor not controlled for. Third, the 
evidence relates to a point in time. Measured values can be subject to transitory 
shocks causing them to differ from the permanent values the theories refer to. Fourth, 
one could argue that while accepting the view that the United States and the 
European Union constitute two polar cases with regard to income redistribution, 
some country other than Switzerland should have been selected as a test case in 
between. 
These limitations have to be taken serious. Above all, they call for additional research 
to answer the question, “Why is there such a marked difference between the United 
States and the European Union in terms of income redistribution?” The present study 
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may provide a few preliminary answers that need to be corroborated. It uses 
Switzerland as a test case because that country, while being in the middle of Europe, 
does have a few features that are reminiscent of the United States, giving it an 
intriguing Janus face. 
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